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THE LABOR COOPERATION AGREEMENT AMONG
MEXICO, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: ITS
NEGOTIATION AND PROSPECTS
ROBERT E. HERZSTEIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)l
represents the first time in the modern trading era (i.e., the period since
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 was adopted) that
an international agreement on labor has been linked to a trade agreement,
both politically and legally. The labor agreement was negotiated entirely
after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 3 was signed,
with a different President and negotiating team on the United States
side. It sets up some novel institutions and commits the three governments-United States, Mexico and Canada-to a program of cooperation
on some of the most novel issues presently faced by international economic
policymakers and politicians. These issues are likely to be the subject of
serious attention for international businessmen, labor unions and political
leaders during the next five to ten years.
The labor side agreement has the potential for significant achievements,
but also for creating some of the more serious difficulties in the U.S.Mexico trading relationship. Yet it was drafted rather rapidly and under
conditions of intense political controversy. Thus, it is useful to have a
brief understanding of its historical and political context.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NAALC

The idea of using a trade agreement between countries to influence
labor policies was raised in the early decades of this century. 4 However,
by and large, the international institutions and agreements for regulating
trade and for regulating labor matters developed on separate tracks. On
one track is the GATT, and on another is the International Labor

*
1.
I.L.M.
2.

Member, Shearman & Sterling, Washington, D.C.
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
1499 [hereinafter NAALC or "the Agreement"].
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 10, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in 1
BAsic DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNoafc LAw 9 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand, eds.,

1990).
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., H.R. Doc. No.
103-159 (effective Jan. 1, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
4. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165 (1993).
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Organization (ILO) 5 and the many agreements it sponsored. Another
example is the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 6 negotiated
only eight years ago, in which there was no suggestion of a labor side
agreement.
The impact of trade liberalization on workers during the GATT era
(i.e., since World War II) was not neglected. It was addressed in all the
trade negotiations by putting transitional measures into trade-liberalizing
agreements. Tariffs were lowered gradually, allowing adjustment of workers and firms before the full impact of competition created by the trade
liberalizing agreement was felt. The impact of trade liberalization on
workers was also often addressed in the domestic adjustment programs
of individual countries that were parties to trade agreements, through
labor retraining programs and other adjustment measures.
The suggestion of a free trade agreement between the United States
and Mexico, which arose in 1989 and 1990 in early meetings between
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and President George Bush, also
contained no reference to inclusion of labor or environmental issues in
7
the agreement.
The issue was first raised in the spring of 1991, when President Bush
had to obtain congressional acquiescence for a two-year extension of the
so-called fast track authority, thus allowing time for him to negotiate
NAFTA. His fast track negotiating authority was coming to an end, and
there was a provision in the law allowing a two-year extension if it was
not disapproved by Congress within a certain period of time. 8 When he
made that request in early spring of 1991, a number of members of
Congress supported the concerns expressed by labor unions and environmental organizations that free trade with Mexico would expose U.S.
industry and workers to competition from companies in Mexico which
did not have to comply with standards applicable to United States-based
companies. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt articulated these
views as the Democratic leader, 9 and they were widely shared among
members of Congress.
On March 7, 1991, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, then Chairman of the
Finance Committee and the Senate leader on trade matters, wrote President
Bush a carefully prepared letter.' 0 In this letter, Senator Bentsen expressed
5. The ILO is a United Nations-related body that fashions labor rights and labor standards
by government, business and labor. For a concise history of the ILO, see DAVID A. MORSE, THE
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ILO AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1969).

6. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 2

BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 359 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand,

eds., 1990).
7. See Understandingbetween the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government
of the United States of America Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks, Action Plan
for Implementation of the October 3 Mandate to Initiate Trade and Investment FacilitationTalks,
& Joint Communique on Trade and Investment, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1325 (1989).
8. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 15 (1989).
9. Congressman Richard Gephardt, Statement on Fast-Track Authority (May 9, 1991).
10. Bentsen, Rostenkowski Urge Bush to Address Environment, Labor & RTA Talks, 109 U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 8, 1991, at 21-26.
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various concerns that were circulating in Congress and asked President
Bush to give assurances to Congress on how he would handle these
concerns in the course of negotiating a free trade agreement with Mexico."
Of course, what Senator Bentsen had in mind was, "Let's take care of
these issues early. Give them your attention and give the Congress the
kind of reassurances it needs so that in the approval of the fast track
authority for the negotiation with Mexico, we can know that those issues
are going to be adequately taken care of and we can smooth the way
for negotiation of a trade agreement and for eventual approval of it by
Congress." One of the prominent issues identified in Senator Bentsen's
letter was, of course, the adequacy of labor standards and worker rights
in Mexico. 12
A little less than two months later, on May 1, 1991, President Bush
sent a carefully crafted response to Senator Bentsen, 3 which was circulated
throughout Congress. On the labor issue President Bush wrote, "President
Salinas has ... made it clear to me that his objective in pursuing free

trade is to better the lives of Mexican working people. Mexico has strong
laws regulating labor standards and worker rights. Beyond what Mexico
is already doing, we will work through new initiatives to expand U.S.Mexico labor cooperation.' ' 4 The phrase, "U.S.-Mexico labor cooperation," signaled a commitment by the President to the Congress. In the
appendices to his response, President Bush reported that the U.S. and
Mexican Secretaries of Labor were prepared to sign a memorandum of
understanding regarding cooperation and joint action on a series of
concerns of workers, including health and safety measures, labor standards
and enforcement, labor conflicts, exchange of statistical information, and
various other areas of concern. 5
On May 9, 1991, Majority Leader Gephardt announced that he would
support the fast track extension on the basis of President Bush's commitment. 6 He did make clear that he reserved the right to oppose the
agreement when it came back to Congress after being negotiated if it
did not achieve certain goals. 7 With that kind of support, the fast track
extension that President Bush requested was granted and the negotiations
began.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. President George Bush, Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with
the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 53637 (May 1, 1991).
14. President George Bush, Letter Accompanying the Response of the Administration to Issues
Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 WEEKLY
ComP. PaEs. Doc. 537 (May 1, 1991).

15. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Cooperation between the Department of Labor
of the United States of America and the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare of the United

Mexican States, attached to Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with
the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 53637 (May 1, 1991).
16. Gephardt Supports Fast Track But Leaves Door Open for Future Amendments, 9 INSME
U.S. TRADE, May 10, 1991, at 18-19.
17. Id.
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When the NAFTA negotiations were completed in the fall of 1992,
the Bush Administration gave a further report to Congress on progress
under the Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Cooperation. 8 That
report describes extensive cooperative activities and improvements achieved
in labor standards and enforcement in Mexico. It details how there had
been improvement in Mexico's own administration of its laws. It also
reported on the establishment of a new Consultative Commission on
Labor Matters to oversee joint activities and to serve as a forum for
continued consultation. 9 It announced the formation of a U.S. working
group to receive complaints from U.S. labor unions and others which
could be taken up in the Consultative Commission. 20 Thus President
Bush, in effect, satisfied-or sought to satisfy-the concerns of Congress
through what he called a "program on labor cooperation." This was
not a binding agreement, but rather a memorandum of understanding
and a program worked out between the Secretaries of Labor of the two
countries.
President Bush signed NAFTA on December 17, 1992.21 President Bush's
plan had been to present NAFTA to Congress along with a report on
progress under the program on labor cooperation, to fulfill his May 1,
1991, commitment to congressional leaders. The President would have
sought to sell NAFTA and the labor program to Congress in that fashion,
but for a very important intervening development-the electoral defeat
of President Bush one month earlier. When Bush signed NAFTA in 1992,
he was a "lame duck" and was not in a position to send NAFTA to
Congress. That would be a task for the new President.
This was the first instance, since the establishment of our modern
trading system, in which a trade agreement signed by one President had
to be presented to Congress by a different President. This situation put
President Bill Clinton in a tight political spot.
Clinton had been, during the campaign, quite ambivalent about his
support for NAFTA. In early October 1992, he gave a campaign speech
in which he announced his support for NAFTA. 22 But his support was
qualified. He said, in effect, that free trade has brought big economic
benefits and free trade with Mexico is very promising, but NAFTA fails
to address important potential adverse consequences of free trade with
Mexico, one of them being certain impacts on workers. 2 Therefore, he
called for negotiation of supplemental agreements, requiring each country
to enforce its own laws on environment and worker standards. He stated

18. Bilateral Cooperation on Labor Issues: Labor Standards, Worker Health and Safety, and
Worker Rights, printed in Report of the Administration on the North American Free Trade Agreement
and Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1, 1991 Commitments (Sept. 18, 1992).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 16-17, app. A.
21. President Bush Signs NAFTA at Ceremony; Clinton to Meet with Salinas in January, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2162 (Dec. 23, 1992).
22. Governor Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, Address at North
Carolina State University (Oct. 4, 1992).
23. Id.
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that NAFTA would be bad for the United States if implemented as Bush
had planned, but good for the country if implemented with the proposed
supplemental agreements. 24 This rhetoric focused the political attention,
including the debate about the desirability of NAFTA, not on NAFTA
itself (a 2,000-page, painfully negotiated document), but on the proposed
side agreements on labor and environmental consequences of NAFTA.
President Clinton thus raised high expectations for what he could achieve
on these issues.
Clinton took office in January 1993, and the negotiation of the side
agreements started in late spring.2 There was intense pressure from some
members of Congress, who urged President Clinton to obtain very strong
agreements, i.e., "with teeth." This became the fashionable test of whether
they would be "good" agreements. The separate agreements on labor
and on the environment 26 were signed by the member countries in September 1993, and the NAFTA package was then presented to Congress.
It was approved in November 1993, in a dramatic and very close vote. 27
Despite the labor side agreement, Majority Leader Gephardt had decided
2
not to support NAFTA; he became the principal leader of the opposition.
The labor unions continued to oppose NAFTA, declaring that they were
not satisfied with the side agreement. Indeed, a majority of Democrats
in the Congress did not support it. NAFTA was approved only by virtue
of the strong support of the business community and some 130 Republican
members of the House of Representatives, who joined the 100 supportive
Democrats. 29
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NAALC
30
The NAALC seeks, first, to establish a broad cooperative program,
building on the Bush-Salinas memorandum of understanding and the
Bush program of cooperation. But then it goes further and establishes
certain obligations. The fundamental obligation is that each of the three
parties-the United States, Canada and Mexico-is to ensure that its own
labor laws provide for "high labor standards,' '31 while recognizing that
each has the right to establish its own standards. In other words, the
Agreement does not set a uniform standard on labor practices; it says

24. Id.
25. Negotiations of NAFTA Side Pacts Set Timetable to Finish Work by Summer, 11 INsIDE
U.S. TPADE, Mar. 19, 1993, at 1-2.
26. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993).
27. See 139 CONG. REc. S16,712 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993); 139 CoNo. Rc. H10,048 (daily ed.
Nov. 17, 1993).
28. Dan Balz, Gephardt's "Quiet" Crusade Against NAFTA, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1993, at A6.
29. House Passes NAFTA With Ease, Giving Clinton a Major Policy Victory, 46 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 19, 1993, at 51-52; Kenneth J. Cooper, Backers Claim Momentum to Carry NAFTA
in House; Trade Pact Split Parties, Crossed PoliticalLines, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al,
A10.
30. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1.
31. Id. art. 2.

U.S. -MEXICO

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

that the parties recognize that each country is in charge of its own labor
32
law programs, but each will attempt to achieve a high level of protection.
The agreement does set forth some labor principles which were endorsed
by all three33 countries as a sort of guideline for defining "high labor
standards."
The Agreement also calls on each government to promote compliance
and to effectively enforce its own laws.3 4 That is perhaps the central
legal obligation of the Agreement. The Agreement also provides that each
party will provide an opportunity for private persons to submit complaints
to the government concerning lapses of labor law observance, 35 along
with an opportunity for access to administrative and judicial tribunals
36
for enforcing the labor law rights of individuals.
It is important to note the kinds of obligations that were not included
in the Agreement. There is no obligation to have the same rights in every
country. There is also no obligation to have the same institutions or
procedures for enforcing them, nor is there an obligation to have the
same quality or style of labor management relations. Finally, there is
explicit rejection of the notion of extraterritorial enforcement by any
37
party in the jurisdiction of another.
The processes the Agreement establishes for achieving compliance with
the obligations can be confusing. Table 1, shown below, is an effort to
outline these procedures. The chart does not include the whole affirmative
cooperation program, but only the procedures designed to achieve compliance with the obligations each party has undertaken.
First, there is a category of activities which are called "Cooperative
Consultations.' '3 A National Administrative Office (NAO) is established
in each country. 39 The NAO of any one country may request consultations
with its counterpart in relation to the other party's "labor law" or its
"administration," or "labor market conditions" in its territory. 4 0 This
provision establishes a broad opportunity for the three NAOs to interact
with each other and learn about each country's system.
If a problem arises on a particular matter, the Agreement then allows
a party to request a Ministerial Consultation with another party on any
matter within the scope of the Agreement. 41 That is the initial and primary
way to take up a problem. If this Consultation does not take care of
' 42
an issue, the Agreement moves on to a process called "Evaluations.
But, as the chart shows, the universe of topics that can be taken

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
Id. annex 1.
Id. art. 3.
Id.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 42.
Id. arts. 20-22.
Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 21.
Id. art. 22.
Id. art. 23.
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up in an Evaluation is not as broad as it is for Ministerial Consultations.
The Ministerial Consultation can be on any matter within the scope of
the Agreement, 4 but the Evaluations can only cover the enforcement of
laws relating to the topics listed at the top of the middle column on the
chart.44
If the United States, for example, feels that Mexico is not properly
enforcing an occupational safety or health law, the United States may
call for an Evaluation. This is accomplished by forming an Evaluation
Committee of Experts (ECE). 45 An ECE is drawn from a roster, previously
prepared by the parties, of independent outside persons with expertise
in the matters that might come up under the list of laws that are subject
to Evaluations. When a particular issue is ready for consideration, the
ECE is picked (by a process set forth in the Agreement) 46 and asked to
investigate.
An important and interesting feature of this evaluation process is that
the ECE analyzes not just the practices of the complained-of party; it
is directed to analyze, in light of the objectives of the Agreement and
in a non-adversarial manner, patterns of practice by each party in the
enforcement of the standard in question. 47 For example, if the formation
of the ECE is stimulated by the fact that the United States has a concern
about Mexico's enforcement of its occupational and safety and health
laws in a particular context, the ECE will look into how each of the
parties is handling that matter. The objective was to promote cooperation
and a help-each-other approach to these issues, rather than a confrontational and accusatory approach.
The ECE issues an evaluation report; 48 then there are further consultations in an effort to resolve the issue. 49 If the issue is not resolved at
that stage and it falls under one of three kinds of laws 50 (which are
indicated at the top of the third column in Table 1), then -it may be
made the subject of dispute resolution. So the universe of topics covered
by the processes of the Agreement narrows as the parties move from
column 1 to column 2 on the chart, and then it narrows further as they
move from column 2 to column 3. A controversy reaches the end of
the road with an ECE, at column 2, unless the matter of concern to
one party involves "occupational
safety and health," "child labor," or
"minimum wage[s].'"'5 If it involves one of those categories, it can move

43. Id. art. 22.
44. Id. art. 23.
45. Id.
46. Id. art. 24.
47. Id. art. 23.
48. Id. arts. 25-26.
49. Id. art. 27.
50. Id. These are occupational safety and health, child labor and minimum wage laws.
51. Id.
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on to dispute resolution under column 3 if certain other conditions are
also present: the dispute has to be "trade-related," and must also relate
to a matter covered by mutually-recognized laws. 52 It cannot, for example,
be a problem of nonenforcement of occupational, safety and health laws
in a situation with no impact on trade between the three countries.
Moreover, as indicated at the very top of column 3, the topic going to
dispute resolution must involve
a "persistent pattern" of failure by another
53
party to enforce its laws.
This completes an overview of the processes that the Agreement establishes for achieving compliance with the commitments, aspirations and
obligations contained in the Agreement.
Does the Agreement create a risk that its processes will be used by
labor unions, who sought to defeat NAFTA, to pursue protectionist
objectives? That is the topic of debate, at least in Washington, at the
present time for those who are following the Agreement and its potential
impact on NAFTA. On its face, the Agreement appears to raise no
opportunity for that. It stresses cooperation, even in its title, and it
requires an effort to resolve problems about labor law enforcement
through several stages of consultation and evaluation. In addition, it puts
the NAO of each government in a position to filter out complaints that
are lacking in substance under the Agreement, or that seem to be filed
for publicity or harassment or for the purpose of achieving protection
against import competition. Moreover, it provides for early consultation
at the ministerial level. The Agreement deliberately attempts to thrust an
issue to the top at an early stage, to enable the issue to be dealt with
quickly before it becomes politicized.
Another feature of the Agreement that is designed to guard against
protectionist abuse is that the first investigation of a matter is undertaken
by neutral outsiders selected from a panel-the ECE. 54 As noted, the
5
ECE looks at the complaint in light of the practices of each country.
This procedure recognizes the reality that on any given day there are
probably many labor law violations in each of the three countries and
that if mere accusations of violations can be the subject of examination
in the Agreement, the Agreement could become a vehicle for unending
disputes, creating an ongoing controversial relationship rather than a
cooperative one. So instead of asking what went wrong, the ECE is
encouraged to ask how the three countries are doing with regard to the
standard in question and how they can work together better. Thus, the
ECE process aims at maximizing the opportunity to improve labor law
enforcement throughout North America.
The Agreement reserves the ultimate sanction of tariff increases 56 for
use as a last resort-only on the most serious problems when, as shown

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 29.
art. 27.
art. 24.
art. 23.
annex 41B.
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at the bottom of column 3 of Table 1, (i) there is a persistent pattern
by one country of failure to enforce one of those three categories of

laws on a trade-related matter; 57 (ii) a panel has set up a proposed remedy,
or an action plan; 58 (iii) the party concerned has failed to implement the0
action plan;59 and (iv) the party concerned has failed to pay a penalty.
Only at that time could a trade sanction be imposed.6' So here, too, the
effort of the negotiators was to minimize the use of sanctions and the
resulting injury to the good relationships under NAFTA.
IV.

RECENT EVENTS

As of August 1994, three petitions have been filed with the U.S. NAO
by U.S. labor unions, making allegations against three different companies
operating in Mexico: General Electric, Honeywell and Sony.6 2 The allegations against General Electric and Honeywell relate to the right of
workers to freely organize, the assertion being that the companies punished
or fired workers who sought to organize their co-workers. 63 The U.S.
NAO agreed to consider those two petitions and held a public hearing
on September 12, 1994. 64 The United States business community argued
that the petitions should not have been accepted because they did not
allege the kind of enforcement shortcomings that the Agreement is designed to examine. They also argued that (1) the NAO should not have
held a hearing; (2) that an NAO hearing is not the process contemplated
by the Agreement; (3) that the NAO is supposed to be a filter and not

a tribunal; and (4) that the first step in actually trying to resolve an
issue should be Ministerial Consultations (or possibly consultations between the NAOs) and not a public and rather confrontational hearing.6 5
Finally, the business community argued that the public hearing lends
itself to abuses of the Agreement by unions that, having unsuccessfully
opposed NAFTA, now want to use the side agreement to harass companies

57. Id. art. 38.
58. Id.
59. Id. art. 39.
60. Id. art. 41.
61. See id.
62. First Complaints Filed Under Labor Side Accord, I INSIDE NAFTA, Feb. 23, 1994, at 3;
NAO Delays Hearings on Worker Rights at GE, Honeywell Plants, I INSIDE NAFTA, Aug. 24,
1994, at 5.
63. See Complaint Before the United States-National Administrative Office, In Re: Honeywell,
Inc. (Feb. 14, 1994); Submission and Request for Review, In Re: General Electric Company (Feb.
14, 1994). Styled as "complaints" by the submitting labor organizations, the Teamsters' submission
against Honeywell is Case No. 940001 (on file with U.S. NAO) and the Electrical Workers' submission
against General Electric is Case No. 940002 (on file with U.S. NAO). See also First Complaints
Filed Under Labor Side Accord, 1 INSIDE NAFTA, Feb. 23, 1994, at 3.
64. U.S. Office to Hold Hearings,Issue Report in NAFTA Labor Complaints, 1 INSsmE NAFTA,
Apr. 20, 1994, at 8; N40 Delays Hearings on Worker Rights at GE, Honeywell Plants, 1 INSIDE
NAFTA, Aug. 24, 1994, at 7-8.
65. See, e.g., Statement by Edward E. Potter, U.S. Council for International Business, to U.S.
NAO (Aug. 31, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
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to discourage such investment and, therefore,
investing in Mexico in order
66
NAFTA.
undermine
to
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LABOR CHALLENGES

How these complaints and others are handled will have important
implications for this Agreement, for NAFTA and, perhaps more importantly, for the entire way in which the United States pursues international agreements on important social issues in connection with trade
negotiations.
The idea of linking trade liberalization with achievement of social goals
is a subject of continuing controversy. Recently, for example, there was
much debate about whether to deny most-favored-nation tariff treatment
to China because of its human rights record. 67 Linkage has also come
up with the U.S. proposal that the new World Trade Organization be
active on labor and environmental issues.68 And the recent Congressional
debate on extension of fast track negotiating authority for the President
has turned decisively on whether future trade agreements will be linked
69
to agreements on labor, the environment and possibly other social issues.
The result of this controversy was the end of the fast track, at least for
the time-being.
VI.

CONCLUSION

We are at a crucial stage, in which the legitimacy of linking agreements
on labor, the environment and perhaps other social questions to trade
agreements is in question. If the NAALC does not function as it was
designed, and promotes confrontation rather than cooperation, this will
lead the community that supports trade liberalization to conclude that
side agreements are a bad idea. If the NAALC is implemented in a way
that fosters cooperative problem-solving, it will demonstrate to both the
skeptics (of whom there are many) and to the believers that side agreements
make sense and should be adopted as an integral part of U.S. international
economic policy.

66. See David R. Sands, New Panel Hears NAFTA Labor Disputes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1994, at B7.
67. Loan Signals China Close to Meeting Human Rights Conditions, 12 INSIE U.S. TRADE,
Apr. 22, 1994, at 14-15.
68. House Bill Calls for WTO Committee on Trade's Labor Rights, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Apr. 22, 1994, at 11-12.
69. Pro-Labor, Environment Democrat, Seek to Exclude Fast Track, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Sept. 2, 1994, at 5-6.

